

[4] Mr Robinson is resident in New Zealand. It is the second threshold, inability to pay, which the defendant relies on. An affidavit has been filed in support of the application. Mr Wilton, the Managing Director of the defendant company, deposes that Mr Robinson will have incurred substantial legal costs in the proceeding and surmises that he will be unable to meet any costs order in respect of the application for rehearing in the event that such application fails.

[5] Mr Tannahill, counsel for the defendant, submits that \$5,000 should be provided by way of security. He rejects any suggestion that the application is being pursued to deter the plaintiff from proceeding with his application for rehearing. He also rejects the suggestion that there have been delays in pursuing the application for

security for costs. He notes that costs in the Authority and the Court remain at large.

³ For example, *Oldco PTI Ltd v Houston* [2010] NZEmpC 161 at [9].

⁴ [Employment Court Regulations 2000](#), reg 6(2)(a)(ii).

Ultimately he says that Mr Robinson is not in a “great financial position”, and appears to have assets which could be used to meet an order for security.

[6] Mrs Kennedy, counsel for the plaintiff, submits that the application for security has been brought on at a late stage, having regard to the history of the proceedings. This, it is said, underlies a concern the plaintiff has that the defendant wishes to delay the proceeding. Mrs Kennedy submits that there may be a number of factors, not yet before the Court, that will be relevant to any outstanding costs issues.

[7] The application for security was focussed on the plaintiff’s ability to meet the costs associated with the application for rehearing. Mr Robinson has sworn an affidavit setting out his financial position, including the net payments he receives a week and the assets that he owns. He is currently unemployed but is actively seeking work. He says that he has incurred legal costs in these proceedings to date, and confirms that he has made arrangements in relation to those expenses.

[8] The application for rehearing is confined to relatively narrow grounds. Costs of around \$5,000 could, in my view, reasonably be expected in relation to the application. I am not satisfied, based on the material before the Court, that the plaintiff will be unable to meet an award of costs if one is made against him in respect of his application for rehearing. That is clear from his evidence relating to income and assets. As Mrs Kennedy points out, by way of reference to *Booth v Big*

Kahuna Holdings Ltd,⁵ difficulty in paying is not the same as an inability to pay.

[9] The threshold in r 5.45(1) has not been met. In these circumstances I do not need to proceed to consider the discretionary factors that might otherwise apply. I record, however, for the sake of completeness that I would not have been minded to exercise my discretion in the defendant’s favour having regard to the broader circumstances of the case. While at this early stage (and in the absence of detailed submissions on the likely merits of the application) I do not regard the prospects of success as high, there are important issues of access to justice that need to be weighed.

Costs

[11] I turn to deal with the issue of costs. The Court’s usual approach to costs is well known and does not need to be repeated. Essentially a starting point of two thirds of actual and reasonable costs is generally applied, with an adjustment as appropriate.⁶

[12] Mrs Kennedy submits that costs of \$4,000 should be awarded, applying the approach under the High Court Rules. She says that actual costs have not yet been fully calculated, but costs of around \$5,000-\$6,000 would likely have been incurred in defending this application.

[13] Mr Tannahill submits that costs on the application for security should be reserved and determined following the application for rehearing. I prefer to deal with costs today, as I earlier indicated I would. This was a discrete application and in my view it is appropriate that costs be awarded on it at this stage. Mr Tannahill says that if costs are to be ordered today, a contribution of no more than \$1,000 would be appropriate. He submits that costs in the region of those said to have been incurred on behalf of the plaintiff are grossly excessive.

[14] I accept that the plaintiff has incurred costs of up to \$6,000. I do not accept that such costs are reasonable having regard to the steps necessary to respond to the defendant’s application, which was narrowly focussed. I do however accept that the defendant requested an oral hearing on the application and that this would have put the plaintiff to some additional expense. Standing back and considering the steps required to respond to the defendant’s application, I am of the view that costs of no more than \$3,000 would be reasonable. There are no factors that warrant an increase or decrease to that starting point. Accordingly the defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff a contribution to his legal costs on this application of \$2,000.

[15] The defendant’s application for security for costs and a stay is dismissed.

[16] The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff a contribution to his legal costs of \$2,000.

Christina Inglis

Judge

Oral Judgment delivered at 11.05 am on 13 November 2014

